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Abstract— We propose randomized frameproof codes for con-
tent protection, which arise by studying a variation of the Boneh-
Shaw fingerprinting problem. In the modified system, whenever
a user tries to access his fingerprinted copy, the fingerprint is
submitted to a validation algorithm to verify that it is indeed
permissible before the content can be executed. We show an
improvement in the achievable rates compared to deterministic
frameproof codes and traditional fingerprinting codes.
For coalitions of an arbitrary fixed size, we construct random-
ized frameproof codes which have an O(n2) complexity validation
algorithm and probability of error exp(−Ω(n)), where n denotes
the length of the fingerprints. Finally, we present a connection
between linear frameproof codes and minimal vectors for size-2
coalitions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The availability of content (e.g., software, movies, music
etc.) in the digital format, although with many advantages,
has the downside that it is now easy for users to make copies,
perform alterations, and share the content illegally. Thus there
is a dire need for protecting the content against unauthorized
redistribution, commonly termed as piracy.
In this paper, we consider a variation of the Boneh-Shaw
fingerprinting scheme [6] for content protection. We start with
an informal description of the problem. We will refer to the
legal content owner as the distributor and the legitimate license
holders as users. The distributor embeds a unique hidden mark,
called a fingerprint, which identifies each licensed copy. The
fingerprint locations, however, remain the same for all users.
The collection of fingerprints is called the codebook and the
distributor uses some form of randomization in choosing the
codebook. We assume that changes to the actual content render
it useless, while the fingerprint may be subject to alterations.
This assumption is reasonable, for instance, in applications to
software fingerprinting.
A single user is unable to pinpoint any of the fingerprint lo-
cations. However, if a set of users, called a coalition of pirates,
compare their copies, they can infer some of the fingerprint
locations by identifying the differences. The coalition now
attempts to create a pirated copy with a forged fingerprint.
In order to define the coalition’s capability in creating the
forgery, Boneh and Shaw introduced the marking assumption,
which simply states that the coalition makes changes only in
those positions where they find a difference (and hence are
definitely fingerprint locations) as they do not wish to damage
the content permanently.
The objective of the distributor is to trace one of the guilty
users whenever such a pirated copy is found. The maximum
coalition size is a parameter of the problem. Such a collection
of fingerprints together with the tracing algorithm is called a
fingerprinting code. This problem has been studied in detail
in [6], [4], [11], [2], where various constructions and upper
bounds have been presented.
Consider now the modified system where each time a user
accesses his fingerprinted copy, the fingerprint is validated
to verify whether it is in fact permissible in the codebook
being used and the execution continues only if the validation is
successful. This limits the forgery possibilities for the pirates at
the cost of an additional validation operation carried out every
time a user accesses his copy. The idea is that by designing an
efficient validation algorithm, we do not pay too high a price.
The advantage of this scheme is demonstrated by an im-
provement in the achievable rates compared to traditional
fingerprinting codes, even though the actual property (cf.
Definition 2.2) is not in general weaker than fingerprinting. In
addition, since the pirates are limited to creating only a valid
fingerprint and because we are interested in unique decoding,
there is no additional tracing needed. The distributor simply
accuses the user corresponding to the fingerprint in the pirated
copy as guilty.
In this case, the coalition is successful if it is able to forge
the fingerprint of an innocent user, thus “framing” him as the
pirate. The distributor’s objective is to design codes for which
the probability that this error event occurs is small, deriving
the name frameproof codes.
In the deterministic case with zero-error probability, frame-
proof codes arise as a special case of separating codes, which
have been studied over many years since being introduced in
[8]. For further references on deterministic frameproof codes
and separating codes, we refer the interested reader to [9],
[7], [10], [5]. In order to emphasize the difference that we
consider the randomized setting, we call our codes randomized
frameproof codes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we give a formal definition for randomized frameproof
codes. Achievable rates under no restrictions on validation
complexity are presented in Section III. In Section IV, we
show the existence of linear frameproof codes and exhibit a
connection to minimal vectors for size-2 coalitions. Finally,
we design a concatenated code with efficient validation for
arbitrary coalition sizes in Section V.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
We will use the following notation. Boldface will denote
vectors. The Hamming distance between vectors x1,x2 will
be denoted by dist(x1,x2). We also write sz(x1, . . . ,xt) to
denote the number of zT columns in the matrix formed with
the vectors x1, . . . ,xt as the rows. For a positive integer n,
the shorthand notation [n] will stand for the set {1, . . . , n}.
We use h(p) := −p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p) to denote the
binary entropy function and D(p||q) := p log2(p/q) + (1 −
p) log2((1−p)/(1− q)) to denote the information divergence.
Let Q be an alphabet (often a field) of finite size q and let
M be the number of users in the system. Assume that there is
some ordering of the users and denote their set by [M ]. The
fingerprint for each user is of length n.
Consider the following random experiment. We have a
family of q-ary codes {Ck, k ∈ K} of length n and size
M. In particular, here the code Ck refers to an ordered
set of M codewords. We pick one of the codes according
to the probability distribution function (pi(k), k ∈ K). For
brevity, the result of this random experiment is called a
randomized code and is denoted by C. The rate of this code
is R = n−1 logqM . We will refer to elements of the set K as
keys. Note that the dependence on n has been suppressed for
simplicity.
The distributor assigns the fingerprints as follows. He
chooses one of the keys, say k, with probability pi(k), and
assigns to user i the ith codeword of Ck, denoted by Ck(i).
Following the standard cryptographic precept that the adver-
sary knows the system, we allow the users to be aware of the
family of codes {Ck} and the distribution pi(·), but the exact
key choice is kept secret by the distributor.
The fingerprints are assumed to be distributed within the
host message in some fixed locations unknown to the users.
Before a user executes his copy, his fingerprint is submitted to
a validation algorithm, which checks whether the fingerprint
is a valid codeword in the current codebook. The execution
continues only if the validation succeeds.
A coalition U of t users is an arbitrary t-subset of [M ]. The
members of the coalition are commonly referred to as pirates.
Suppose the collection of fingerprints assigned to U, namely
Ck(U), is {x1, . . . ,xt}. The goal of the pirates is to create
a forged fingerprint different from theirs which is valid under
the current key choice.
Coordinate i of the fingerprints is called undetectable for the
coalition U if x1i = x2i = · · · = xti and is called detectable
otherwise. We assume that the coalition follows the marking
assumption [6] in creating the forgery.
Definition 2.1: The marking assumption states that for any
fingerprint y created by the coalition U , yi = x1i = x2i =
· · · = xti in every coordinate i that is undetectable.
In other words, in creating y, the pirates can modify only
detectable positions.
For a given set of observed fingerprints {x1, . . . ,xt}, the
set of forgeries that can be created by the coalition is called the
envelope. Its definition depends on the exact rule the coalition
should follow to modify the detectable positions [4]:
• If the coalition is restricted to use only a symbol from
their assigned fingerprints in the detectable positions, we
obtain the narrow-sense envelope:
e(x1, . . . ,xt) = {y ∈ Q
n|yi ∈ {x1i, . . . , xti}, ∀i ∈ [n]};
(1)
• If the coalition can use any symbol from the alphabet
in the detectable positions, we obtain the wide-sense
envelope:
E(x1, . . . ,xt) = {y ∈ Q
n|yi = x1i, ∀i undetectable}.
(2)
For the binary alphabet, both envelopes are exactly the
same. In the following, we will use E(·) to denote the envelope
from any of the rules mentioned above.
Definition 2.2: A randomized code C is said to be t-
frameproof with ε-error if for all U ⊆ [M ] such that |U | ≤ t,
it holds that
Pr{E(C(U)) ∩ (C\C(U)) 6= ∅} ≤ ε, (3)
where the probability is taken over the distribution pi(·).
Remark 2.3: Note that the t-frameproof property as defined
above is not in general weaker than the t-fingerprinting
property, i.e., a code which is t-fingerprinting with ε-error
[6, Definition IV.2] is not automatically t-frameproof with ε′-
error, for any 0 ≤ ε′ < 1.
A straightforward extension of the fingerprinting definition
yields a randomized code which satisfies the following condi-
tion: For any coalition of size at most t and any strategy they
may use in devising a forgery, the probability that the forgery
is valid is small. However, this definition would trivially enable
us to achieve arbitrarily high rates. Hence, we use the above
(stronger) definition.
III. LOWER BOUNDS FOR BINARY FRAMEPROOF CODES
Let us construct a binary randomized code C of length n
and size M = 2nR as follows. We pick each entry in the
M × n matrix independently to be 1 with probability p, for
some 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
Theorem 3.1: The randomized code C is t-frameproof with
error probability decaying exponentially in n for any rate
R < −pt log2 p− (1− p)
t log2(1− p). (4)
Proof: For γ > 0, define the set of t-tuples of vectors
Tt,γ :=
{
(x1, . . . ,xt) :
s1(x1, . . . ,xt) ∈ Iγ ,
s0(x1, . . . ,xt) ∈ Jγ
}
,
where Iγ := [n(pt − γ), n(pt + γ)] and Jγ := [n((1 − p)t −
γ), n((1−p)t+γ)]. It is clear that for any coalition U of size
t, the observed fingerprints (x1, . . . ,xt) belong to Tt,γ with
high probability1. Hence, we will refer to Tt,γ as the set of
typical fingerprints. For any coalition U of size t
Pr{E(C(U)) ∩ (C\C(U)) 6= ∅}
≤ Pr{C(U) /∈ Tt,γ}
+ Pr{∃y ∈ C\C(U) : y ∈ E(C(U))|C(U) ∈ Tt,γ}. (5)
The first term in the above equation decays exponentially in
n. It is left to prove that the second term is also exponentially
decaying for R satisfying (4).
A codeword in C\C(U) is a part of E(C(U)) if it contains a
1 (resp. 0) in all s1(C(U)) (resp. s0(C(U))) positions. Since
C(U) ∈ Tt,γ , by taking a union bound the second term in (5)
is at most
2nRpn(p
t−γ)(1− p)n((1−p)
t−γ),
which decays exponentially in n for
R < −(pt − γ) log2 p− ((1 − p)
t − γ) log2(1− p).
The proof is completed by taking γ to be arbitrarily small.
The bias p in the construction of C can be chosen optimally
for each value of t. Numerical values of the rate thus obtained
are shown in Table I, where they are compared with the
existence bounds for deterministic zero-error frameproof codes
(from [7]) and rates of fingerprinting codes (from [2], [1]).
Observe that there is a factor of t improvement compared to
the rate of deterministic frameproof codes.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF RATES
Rates
t Randomized Deterministic Fingerprinting
Frameproof Frameproof
2 0.5 0.2075 0.25
3 0.25 0.0693 0.0833
4 0.1392 0.04 0.0158
5 0.1066 0.026 0.0006
IV. LINEAR FRAMEPROOF CODES
Unlike fingerprinting codes, randomized frameproof codes
eliminate the need for a tracing algorithm, but the fingerprints
still need to be validated. As the validation algorithm is
executed everytime a user accesses his copy, we require
that this algorithm have an efficient running time. Although
the codes designed in the previous section have high rates,
they come at the price of an exp(n) complexity validation
algorithm. Linear codes are an obvious first choice in trying
to design efficient frameproof codes as they can be validated
in O(n2) time by simply verifying the parity-check equations.
1We say that an event occurs with high probability if the probability that
it fails is at most exp(−cn), where c is a positive constant.
A. Linear construction for t = 2
We now present a binary linear frameproof code for t = 2
which achieves the rate given by Theorem 3.1. Suppose we
have M = 2nR users. We construct a randomized linear code
C as follows. Pick a random n(1−R)×n parity-check matrix
with each entry chosen independently to be 0 or 1 with equal
probability. The corresponding set of binary vectors which
satisfy the parity-check matrix form a linear code of size 2nR
with high probability. Each user is then assigned a unique
codeword selected uniformly at random from this collection. In
the few cases that the code size exceeds 2nR, we simply ignore
the remaining codewords during the assignment. However,
note that since the validation algorithm simply verifies the
parity-check equations, it will pronounce the ignored vectors
also as valid.
Theorem 4.1: The randomized linear code C is 2-
frameproof with error probability decaying exponentially in
n for any rate R < 0.5.
Proof: As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we begin by
defining the set of typical pairs of fingerprints. For γ > 0,
define
Tγ :=
{
(x1,x2) : sij(x1,x2) ∈ Iγ , ∀i, j ∈ {0, 1}
}
,
where Iγ := [n(1/4 − γ), n(1/4 + γ)]. For any coalition U of
two users
Pr{E(C(U)) ∩ (C\C(U)) 6= ∅}
≤ Pr{C(U) /∈ Tγ}+
∑
(x1,x2)∈Tγ
Pr{C(U) = (x1,x2)}
× Pr{∃y ∈ C : y ∈ E(x1,x2)\{x1,x2}|C(U) = (x1,x2)}.
It can be seen that the first term again decays exponentially
in n. We now consider the term inside the summation
Pr{∃y ∈ C : y ∈ E(x1,x2)\{x1,x2}|C(U) = (x1,x2)}.
Observe that for any two binary vectors (x1,x2) ∈ Tγ , the
sum x1+x2 /∈ E(x1,x2) and also 0 /∈ E(x1,x2). Therefore,
every vector in E(x1,x2)\{x1,x2} is linearly independent
from x1,x2. Thus for any y ∈ E(x1,x2)\{x1,x2},
Pr{y ∈ C|C(U) = (x1,x2)} = Pr{y ∈ C} = 2
−n(1−R).
Since (x1,x2) ∈ Tγ , |E(x1,x2)| ≤ 2n(1/2+2γ). By taking the
union bound and γ to be arbitrarily small, we obtain the result.
B. Connection to minimal vectors
In this subsection, we show a connection between linear
2-frameproof codes and minimal vectors. We first recall the
definition for minimal vectors (see, for e.g., [3]). Let C be
a q-ary [n, k] linear code. The support of a vector c ∈ C is
given by supp(c) = {i ∈ [n] : ci 6= 0}. We write c′  c if
supp(c′) ⊆ supp(c).
Definition 4.2: A nonzero vector c ∈ C is called minimal
if 0 6= c′  c implies c′ = αc, where c′ is another code
vector and α is a nonzero constant.
Proposition 4.3: For any x1,x2 ∈ C, x1 6= x2, if x2−x1
is minimal then e(x1,x2) ∩ (C\{x1,x2}) = ∅. If q = 2, the
converse is also true.
Proof: Consider any y ∈ Qn and define the translate
y
′ := y − x1. It follows that
y ∈ C ⇔ y′ ∈ C (6)
y /∈ {x1,x2} ⇔ y
′ /∈ {0,x2 − x1}. (7)
Furthermore, if yi ∈ {x1i, x2i}, then y′i ∈ {0, x2i − x1i} for
all i ∈ [n]. Therefore,
y ∈ e(x1,x2)⇒
{
y
′  x2 − x1,
y
′ 6= α(x2 − x1), ∀α /∈ {0, 1}.
(8)
Using (6), (7), (8), we obtain that e(x1,x2)∩(C\{x1,x2}) 6=
∅ implies that x2 − x1 is non-minimal.
For q = 2, it is easily seen that the reverse statement also
holds in (8) and thus the converse is also true.
Recall the random linear code constructed by generating
a random n(1 − R) × n parity-check matrix in the previous
subsection. With some abuse of notation, let us denote the
(unordered) set of vectors satisfying the random parity-check
matrix also by C. Let M(C) denote the set of minimal vectors
in C. We have the following companion result to Corollary 2.5
in [3].
Corollary 4.4: As n→∞,
E
[
|M(C)|
|C|
]
=
{
1, R < 1/2
0, R > 1/2
Proof: As a consequence of Proposition 4.3, for any two
users {u1, u2}, we obtain
Pr{E(C(u1, u2)) ∩ (C\C(u1, u2)) 6= ∅}
=Pr{C(u2)− C(u1) /∈ M(C)}
=1− E
[
|M(C)|
|C| − 1
]
.
The first part of the result is now true by Theorem 4.1. We
skip the details of the latter part which is easily proved using
Chernoff bounds.
C. Linear codes for larger t
In the light of Theorem 4.1, a natural question to ask is
whether there exist randomized linear frameproof codes for
t > 2, perhaps allowing even a larger alphabet. It turns out
that, just as in the deterministic case, linear frameproof codes
do not always exist in the randomized setting too.
Proposition 4.5: There do not exist q-ary linear t-
frameproof codes with ε-error, 0 ≤ ε < 1, which are secure
with the wide-sense envelope if either t > q or q > 2.
Proof: Consider a coalition of q+1 users. For any linear
code realized from the family where the observed fingerprints
are, say, x1, . . . ,xq+1, the forgery y = x1 + · · · + xq+1
is a part of E(x1, . . . ,xq+1). In addition, it is also a valid
fingerprint as the code is linear. This proves the first part of
the proposition.
To prove the second part, consider an alphabet (a field) with
q > 2. For any two pirates with fingerprints x1 and x2, the
forgery y = αx1 + (1 − α)x2, where α 6= 0, 1, is a valid
codeword (by linearity) and is also a part of the wide-sense
envelope.
Consequently, in considering linear frameproof codes which
are wide-sense secure, we are limited to t = 2, q = 2.
V. POLYNOMIAL-TIME VALIDATION FOR LARGER t
Usually, the amount of redundancy needed increases with
the alphabet size in fingerprinting applications. Thus, we are
mainly interested in constructing binary frameproof codes
which have polynomial-time validation. With the binary alpha-
bet, there is no distinction between wide-sense and narrow-
sense envelopes. Therefore, there do not exist binary linear
frameproof codes for t > 2 by Proposition 4.5. In this section,
we use the idea of code concatenation to construct a binary
frameproof code with polynomial-time validation.
In the case of deterministic codes, if both the inner and
outer codes are t-frameproof ((t, 1)-separating) with zero-
error, then the concatenated code is also t-frameproof. We
will now establish a similar result when the inner code is a
randomized t-frameproof code.
Let the outer code Cout be a (deterministic) q-ary linear
[N,K,∆] code. For each of the N coordinates of the outer
code, generate an independent instance of a randomized binary
code Cin of length m and size q which is t-frameproof with
ε-error. Then the concatenated code C with outer code Cout
and inner code independent instances of Cin is a randomized
binary code of length n = Nm and size qK .
Theorem 5.1: If the relative minimum distance of Cout
satisfies
∆
N
≥ 1−
1
t
(1 − ξ) (9)
and the error probability ε < ξ for Cin, then the concatenated
code C is t-frameproof with error probability 2−ND(ξ||ε) and
has a poly(n) validation algorithm.
Proof: In the proof, all vectors are q-ary corresponding
to the outer alphabet. Define
s(y, {x1, . . . ,xt}) := |{i ∈ [N ] : yi ∈ {x1i, . . . , xti}}|,
d(y, {x1, . . . ,xt}) := min
i∈[t]
dist(y,xi).
Consider a coalition U ⊆ {1, . . . , qK} of size t. For any
coordinate i ∈ [N ] of the outer code, the coalition observes at
most t different symbols of the outer alphabet, i.e., at most t
different codewords of the inner code. Thus if the t-frameproof
property holds for the observed symbols for the realization
of Cin at coordinate i, then at the outer level the coalition
is restricted to output one of the symbols it observes, i.e., the
narrow-sense rule (1) holds. On the other hand, a failure of the
t-frameproof property at the inner level code implies that the
coalition is able to create a symbol different from what they
observe in the corresponding coordinate at the outer level.
Accordingly, let χi, i = 1, . . . , N, denote the indicator
random variables (r.v.s) for failures at the inner level with
Pr{χi = 1} ≤ ε since the inner code has ε-error. Note
that χi are independent because we have an independent
instance of the randomized code for every i = 1, . . . , N.
Then Z =
∑N
i=1 χi is a Binomial r.v. denoting the number
of coordinates where the narrow-sense rule fails at the outer
level. For 0 ≤ z ≤ N, let ez(·) denote the envelope when the
narrow-sense rule is followed only in some N − z outer-level
coordinates, i.e.,
ez(x1, . . . ,xt) = {y : s(y, {x1, . . . ,xt}) ≥ N − z}.
For any y ∈ ez(x1, . . . ,xt), there exists some l ∈ {1, . . . , t}
such that s(y,xl) ≥ (N − z)/t, i.e., dist(y,xl) ≤ N − (N −
z)/t. Therefore,
ez(x1, . . . ,xt) ⊆
{
y : d(y, {x1, . . . ,xt}) ≤ N −
N − z
t
}
.
(10)
The coalition U succeeds when it creates a forgery which is
valid in the outer code. Thus the probability of error is at most
Pr{∃y ∈ Cout\Cout(U) : y ∈ eZ(Cout(U))}
≤Pr
{
∃y ∈ Cout\Cout(U) : d(y, Cout(U)) ≤ N −
N − Z
t
}
(11)
=Pr
{
N −
N − Z
t
≥ ∆
}
(12)
≤Pr{Z ≥ Nξ} (13)
≤2−ND(ξ||ε), (14)
where (11) follows from (10), (12) is because Cout is a linear
code with minimum distance ∆, (13) is due to the condition
(9) and (14) is obtained by standard large deviation bounds.
The validation algorithm operates in two steps. In the first
step, the inner code is decoded/validated for every outer code
coordinate by exhaustive search over q codewords. We then
check whether the resulting q-ary vector is a member of the
outer code by verifying the parity-check equations. The claim
about the polynomial-time complexity is true by choosing an
appropriate scaling for the inner code length, for instance, m ∼
log2(n).
We now make specific choices for the outer and inner codes
in Theorem 5.1 to arrive at explicit constructions. We take Cin
to be the binary randomized t-frameproof code presented in
Theorem 3.1 and with growing length. Thus we have the inner
code rate as
Rt = max
p∈[0,1]
[
−pt log2 p− (1− p)
t log2(1− p)
]
and error probability ε = 2−mβ for some β > 0. The outer
code Cout is a [q − 1,K] Reed-Solomon (RS) code with rate
at most (1 − ξ)/t in order to satisfy the condition (9) on the
minimum distance. Observe that for ε approaching 0 (for large
m) and ξ fixed, D(ξ||ε) ∼ ξ log2(1/ε). Therefore, with ε =
2−mβ , the error probability of the concatenated code is at most
2−n(ξβ+o(1)). By taking ξ arbitrarily small and m sufficiently
large to satisfy ε < ξ, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 5.2: The binary randomized code obtained by
concatenating Cout and Cin is t-frameproof with error prob-
ability exp(−Ω(n)), validation complexity O(n2) and rate
arbitrarily close to Rt/t.
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of upper bounds on the rate of randomized
frameproof codes is open.
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